Energy coupon: A mean field game perspective on demand response in smart grids
Published in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 2015
Recommended citation: [bib file] Li, Jian, Bainan Xia, Xinbo Geng, Hao Ming, Srinivas Shakkottai, Vijay Subramanian, and Le Xie. "Energy coupon: A mean field game perspective on demand response in smart grids." ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 43, no. 1 (2015): 455-456. https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2745890
We consider the problem of a Load Serving Entity (LSE) trying to reduce its exposure to electricity market volatility by incentivizing demand response in a Smart Grid setting. We focus on the day-ahead electricity market, wherein the LSE has a good estimate of the statistics of the wholesale price of electricity at different hours in the next day, and wishes its customers to move a part of their power consumption to times of low mean and variance in price. Based on the time of usage, the LSE awards a differential number of “Energy Coupons” to each customer in proportion to the customer’s electricity usage at that time. A lottery is held periodically in which the coupons held by all the customers are used as lottery tickets.
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